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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports the findi ngs of a laboratory test of a number of predictions 
derived from modern auction theory. The primary focus is on the effic iency and 
distrihutional consequences of the common practi ce of selling a variety of dif-
ferent items in " lots' ' or " bundles." Recent developments in auction theory 
allow one to make rather sharp predictions about how allocations are affected 
by the way the seller chooses to package diffe rent items together to form lots. 
By replicating the environment spec ified by the model very accurately in con-
trolled laboratory auctions, these predictions are tested. The data are found to 
provide strong support for many of the theoretical propositions. 
A brief verbal description of the auction environment is the fo llowing. There 
are several buyers and one se ller. The seller has a set of indivisible items to 
sell. The seller makes a bundling decision, which is a partition of the set of 
items into mutually exclusive and co llecti vely exhaustive subsets called bundles. 
The seller places the bundles for sale using a firsi-price sealed-bid auction. In 
each such auction, the seller so licits private, written bids for a bundle from each 
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buyer and sell s that bundle to the highest bidder at a price equal to the highes t 
bid. 
The se ller and the bidders may face uncertainty for a variety of reasons, so a 
key element of the model is the specific type of information structure in these 
markets which is postulated . The information structure is the following. 1 Each 
buyer is supposed to have a fi xed "valuation" for each item that is known to 
no other buyer. Each buyer knows only the probability distribution from which 
the valuations of each of the items for each of the other bidders were independ-
ent ly drawn. Buyers all know their own valuations with certainty. A buyer's 
valuation for a bundle simply equals the sum of his valuations of the items 
contained in the bundle. Each buyer also knows how many other buyers are 
competing in the auct ion . 
Each auction is modeled as a game with incomplete information in which each 
buyer is a player. A strategy of a player is simply a function which maps 
valuations into bids. 
The (Nash) equilibrium bidding functi on of values generally depend upon the 
number of competing bidders and the probability di stribution of buyers' valua-
tions of the bundle. Since the probability di stribution depends upon the particular 
way the seller bundles the items, equilibrium bidding behavior is influenced by 
this bundling decision. Consequently, the final allocation , seller' s expected rev-
enue, the effi ciency of the final allocation, and the distribution of surplus among 
the buyers will all depend upon the way the seller partitions the goods into 
bundles . 
In order to provide a clear test of the predictions generated by this model , a 
number of variables must be measurable and controllable. In particular, reason-
able comparisons with the theoretical predictions require a knowledge of the 
relevant probabi lity di stributions. buyer valuations, and the number of compet ing 
bidders. In addit ion, fo ur key assumptions are made in the theoretical model 
which are particularl y difficult to control for. One of these assumptions is that 
a buyer's valuation for a lot equals the sum of his valuations for the bundle. A 
second assumption is that there is no aftermarket in which the items may be 
resold by the winning bidder to the other buyers who partic ipated in the auction. 
A third assumption is that all of the buyers are risk neutral. A fo urth assumption 
is that the postulated information structure accurately describes buyer information. 
The type of data available from real estate auctions , art auctions, and other 
frequently held auctions can be obtained easil y enough, but do not provide enough 
information to measure and contro l for all of the parameters and assumptions of 
the model. In other words. such data would provide at best a very rough test of 
the theory. For this reason, a series of experimental auctions was designed and 
carried out in a carefull y controlled laboratory environment. The buyers in these 
laboratories were given complete and accurate information about the distribution 
from which values were drawn and the number of bidders in each auction. All 
four key assumptions were met. One of these assumptions, that all buyers are 
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risk neutral , normally would be impossible to control for. However , even though 
buyers faced risk in each particular auction, each buyer participated in a suffi-
ciently large number of auctions that any risk which existed was judged not 
likely to be a problem. One of the more useful aspects of using experimental 
auctions is that it is possible to sell an item twice-once as a single-item bundle 
and once as part of a two-item bundle. This allows us to directly compare seller 
revenues, distributional consequences, buyer strategies, and market efficiency 
in separate as opposed to bundled auctions. This opportunity is fully exploited 
in this series of experiments. 
The use of experiments to test theories about sealed bid auctions is not new. 
Frahm and Schrader (l 970), Smith ( 1967) , Miller and Plott ( 1979) , Belovicz 
( 1977) , and Coppinger et al. ( 1980) have presented results relating to the com-
parative revenue-generating power of various auction mechanisms . These mech-
anisms include first-price sealed-bid auctions, second-price sealed-bid auctions. 
English (oral progressive) auctions, and Dutch (descending bid) auctions. Not 
surprisingly , some of the aforementioned authors' observations about buyer be-
havior in first -price sealed-bid auctions were also observed in the experiments 
discussed below. 
II. THE MODEL 
One seller has J indivisible goods (items) to sell. There are n potential buyers. 
Denote by vj the value of item j to buyer i. These nJ values are independent 
samples drawi:_ from the same probability distribution, denoted by its cdf, F( · ), 
defined on[.".'., v]; F(·) is common knowledge to the buyers. Each buyer i observes 
only his own vector of values (v;, ... , v;). The seller conducts an auction in 
which he solicits n sealed bids, b1> ... ,b", one from each buyer. The buyer 
who submits the highest bid pays the seller his bid and receives the bundle of 
J 
all J items. The utility (payoff) to buyer i is I vj - b' if he wins the auction 
and is 0 otherwise. Ties are broken randomly. Implicitly we are assuming: 
I. Values are additive. 
2. Buyers are risk neutral. 
This auction is modeled as a game of incomplete information. The strategy 
of a buyer is a bidding function b': (v; , .... v;) ~ R. Without loss of generality 
J 
attention is restricted to functions of the form b': I v; ~ R. Denote v;J, = 
J 
I vj. An equilibrium is a set of functions (b; .... ,b,",) such that for all i 
j~ I 
b,(Y;n) maximizes buyer i's expected payoff given v; 11 , where the expectat ion 
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is over {Y'JJ,}" , assuming buyer k bids according to bk(-) for all k ~ i. The cdf 
k ,_i- j 
of v;1,, H1( · ), is given by the J-fold convolution of F(-) and is the same for all 
buyers. 
Using the results of the aforementioned authors, there exists a symmetric 
equilibrium b1(Y,111) = .. . = b"(Y ;~ ,) = b*(VJJ 1) given by 
The expected payoff to buyer i, ES;(Y\J 1), is IY;JJi - b*(Y\1i}] IH(Y);JJ>)l'' - 1, 
and so we can write 
f [H1(x)l" - 1 dx . 
Jy 
The expected winning bid (i.e., expected profit to seller), EirJJ ,, is 
This is sufficient information to compare outcomes from different partitions of 
the J items into smaller bundles. For example, if the J items are all sold separate ly. 
then a buyer's expected surplus in all J auctions is 
v) 
ES' ±J IF(x) ]" - 1 dx 
j = l l' 
and 
v 
' 
ETI = J J [ x(F(x))" - 1 - I (F(x))" - 1 dx] nf(x) dx. 
y 
With relati vely minor algebraic manipulations. we can obtain the follow ing 
results. These are stated below for the special case of the uni form distribution 
since th is was the distribution used in the experiments. Proofs are not included. 
For more general and fo rmal statements and proofs, sec Palfrey (1980). 
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(Pl) If there are two buyers competing in an auction, then the expected 
revenue per item generated in a bundled auction is an increasing .fi111ction 
of the number of items in the bundle. 
(P2) If there are more than three buyers, then the expected revenue per item 
generated in a bundled auction is a decreasing function of the number o/ 
items in the bundle . 
The intuition behind (PI) and (P2) is that the expected second highest sample 
out of N draws from the distribution is the seller's expected revenue, where N 
is the number of bidders. Since the distribution of the value of a given item is 
a simple mean preserving spread of the distribution of the average value of a 
bundle of at least two items, then if the expected second highest sample of N 
draws from the distribution is greater than the mean of the distribution, it will 
also be greater than the expected second highest sample of N draws from a 
distribution of the average value of a bundle containing at least two items . 
Similarly, if the expected second highest value is less than the mean, the opposite 
will be true. 
In (PI) , there are only two bidders, so the expected second highest value is 
the expected lowest value which is always less than the mean. In (P2), the 
expected second highest value with more than three bidders is always greater 
than the mean for any symmetric distribution such as the uniform distribution. 
Hence bundling will hurt the seller in this case. A general rule , reflected in both 
(P 1) and (P2), is that the absolute difference between the expected revenue per 
item in a bundled auction and the expected revenue per item in separate auctions 
is an increasing function of the number of items being bundled. 
Another prediction about the seller's revenue is that more buyers increase the 
seller's revenue . 1 
(P3) The expected revenue jiwn an auction is an increasing fun ction of the 
number of buyers. 
This is a very well known and intuitively evident theoretical result. 
The next set of propositions will lead to specific hypotheses about buyer surplus 
and the distributional consequences of the seller's bundling decision . One key 
result from the model is that when there are two buyers then all buyers will 
prefer separate auctions ex ante . Note that it does 1101 imply that a buyer will 
prefer separate auctions in every state of the world. 
(P4) ~f there are two buyers, then no matter what values a buyer has for 
the items, the expected surplus to that buver is greater in separate auctions 
than in a bundled auction. 
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The intuition behind prediction (P4) is that. wi th a smal l number of buyers , all 
buyers are better off as the distribution becomes more spread out. The distribution 
of values for a bundle is less spread out than the distribution of the component 
items of the bundle. However, if there are more than two buyers, then a buyer 
who has extremely high values for a bundle prefers a less dispersed distribution. 
The logic behind this is that in a less dispersed distribution the probability that 
such a buyer would have the highest va lue is greater. Hence, for large numbers 
of bidders one loses the " unanimity" result of prediction (P4). An even stronger 
statement of (P4) can be made: 
(PS) If there are two buyers. then the expected surplus to a buyer is a 
decreasing function of the number of items bundled. 
The above argument also leads to several specific predictions about which 
buyers wi ll prefer a bundled auct ion if there are more than two buyers. 
(P6) If there are more than three buyers. then buyers with relatively high 
valuations on all items and relatively small variation in valuation will prefer 
a bundled auction lo several separate auctions. 
This prediction expresses the rather obvious notion that in general different buyers 
are differently affected by the seller's bundling decision . In a similar vein, theory 
yields the following two propositions. which hold regardless of the number of 
bidders: 
(P7) Buyers with relatively high variation in valuations are relatively worse 
off when the seller bundles compared to buyers who have the same average 
valuation but less variation in their values. 
(P8) Buvers with relatively low average valuations are relatively better off 
when the st/fer bundles compared lo buyers who have the same variation 
in valuation but have medium valuations. 
As an example to illustrate the intuition behi~d (P7), consider the following. 
A buyer has a valuat ion of~ on one item and v (the maximum possible value) 
on the second item. If these two items are sold separately , the bidder wi ll (in 
equilibrium) win the second item with probability 1. However if the two items 
are bundled and sold together in a single auct ion , this bidder will probably win 
neither item. This is particularly obvious if there are many bidders. In addition, 
in equilibrium the profit he makes in the bundled auction if he wins is less than 
the equilibrium profit if he wins £_he seco~d of two separate auctions. Suppose 
that this buyer's valuations were v/2 and v/2 instead. In such a case the bidder 
is affected not nearly as much by a sell er who chooses to bundle. 
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The next prediction relates to individual bidding behavior and is easily derived 
theoretically using techniques developed by Vickrey ( 1961) to calculate the 
equi librium bidding functions in single- item and bundled auctions when va lues 
of items are distributed uniformly. This prediction is an interesting one to consider 
because it is a simple qualitative prediction about the effects of bundling on 
individual bidding behavior and it is an important prediction about bidding 
behav ior that leads to a number of the other theoretical results. 
(P9) (Superadditive bidding) If there are two bidders, then a bidder with a 
given set of values for a given set of items will bid an amount in a bundled 
auction which is greater than the sum of his bids if the items were sold in 
separate auctions. 
As in some of the earlier predictions, thi s is due to the fact that the distribution 
of values for a single item is a mean-preserving spread of the distribu tion of 
sums of values for a bundle of items. 
The final prediction addresses aggregate welfare effects of bundling: 
(PIO) The total surplus per item generated by an auction is a decreasing 
ji111ction of the number of items sold as a bundle in that auction. 
In other words, bundling creates inefficiencies. The intu ition behind this is 
simple. If items are sold separately, in equilibrium the highest bidder in a given 
auction will have the highest valuation for the corresponding item. This is an 
efficient allocation. If several items are sold as a bundle. then in equilibrium the 
highest bidder for that auction will have the highest va luation for the bundles. 
However. that buyer wil l not in general have the highest valuation for each 
separate item in the bundle . This leads to the possibility of ex post gains from 
trade. i.e. , ineffi ciencies . 
III. EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN 
Three series of experiments, using a total of 24 different subjects, were designed 
and carried out:' Each experiment consisted of 240 different auctions in which 
experimental subjects were buying items from the experimenter. In 120 of these 
auctions there were two competing buyers, and in 120 of the auctions there were 
four competing buyers. This divided the auctions into two sets of market sizes 
according to the number of competing bidders. For each market size there were 
40 auctions selling a single item, 40 auct ions sell ing two items bundled together. 
and 40 auctions se lling four items bundled together. Thus the auct ions are d ivided 
into three sets along the dimension of bundle size. This 2 x 3. or 6-cell, design 
is summarized in Table I . The entry in each cell of the table indicates the number 
of auctions of that type in an experiment. Henceforth , a cell will be referred to 
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Table I . The Basic 2 x 3 Experimental Design 
Markl't Si:<' 
2 Biddns 4 /Jiddcrs 
I lt<'m I IV 40 40 
IJ1111dlt· 2 //l'l/IS II v Si:e 40 40 
.J //C'l/I S Ill V I 40 40 
by the Roman numeral in the upper right hand corner of that cell in Table 1; 
the buyers in an experiment will be referred to by Arabic numerals I through 
8. 
As one can eas il y deduce, no buyer competed in all auctions. In particular, 
each buyer competed in JO of the 40 auctions in each of ce lls I, II. and Ill and 
20 of the 40 auctions in each of ce lls IV, V, and YI. Specification of which 
auctions a buyer participated in is given in detail later on in this section . However, 
at this point it will be helpful to describe how buyers' valuations for items were 
induced. 
For each auction in cells I and IV , each participating buyer was given a 
valuation which was independently drawn at random from the interval $0. 00-
$ 1.99. All valuations were in penny increments. The va lues of the bundles for 
which buyers competed in cells II and V were determined by adding together 
values which had been randomly drawn for items in cell s I and IV. Whichever 
subset of the buyers competed in two single- item auctions also competed in the 
corresponding two-item bundled auction. Simi larl y, the values of the bundles 
for which buyers competed in cell s Ill and VI were obtained by adding together 
values of certain pairs of two-item bundles from ce ll s II and V. Again , whichever 
subset of the buyers competed in a pair of two-item bundled auct ions also 
competed in the corresponding fou r-item bundled auction. 
In order to fac ilitate smooth operation of the experiment , the 240 auctions in 
each sess ion were conducted in five different periods. This meant that in each 
year buyers had to make simultaneous bidding decisions in only 18 auctions 
rather than make 90 decisions all at once. Conducting the experiment in this 
fashion also allowed buyers to make adjustments in their strategies after each 
year if they wished. Of the 18 experiments in which each buyer participated 
during a market year, there were two each in cells I, II , and Ill and four each 
in cells IV, V, and YI. Which auctions were conducted in which year was 
randomized for each cell. 
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A potential problem with this particular design is that if a buyer can figure 
out which bundled auctions correspond to which unbundled auctions that buyer 
will be able to use information from previous auctions to update his priors about 
the distribution of competitors' valuations in corresponding auctions which may 
occur in later years. This problem was avoided in the following way. For each 
bundle in cells II and V for which a buyer would be competing that buyer was 
given two new values which were randomly chosen subject to the constraint that 
the sum of the two values equaled the sum of the two values of the items in the 
corresponding single-item auctions of cells I and IV. The buyers were not in-
formed that these draws were dependent in this way on earlier draws. This 
prevented buyers from inferring that there was a connection between the auctions 
in different cells. Buyers viewed each auction as a completely independent event. 
The next problem to overcome involved setting up the auctions so that the 
same bidders who competed with each other in a bundled auction also competed 
with each other in the corresponding separate auctions. This was done as follows. 
In cells I, II , and Ill buyers only competed in the following pairs: [1 ,2]; [1 ,3 ]; 
[2,3]; [4 ,5 ]; 14,6]; 15 ,6 ]; 17,8]. The first six of these groups competed in 5 
auctions in each of cells I, 11 , and Ill , while the last group , [7,8], competed in 
I 0 auctions in each of these cells. In cells IV, V, and VI the buyers were divided 
into two groups, I 1,3,5,7] and 12,4,6,8]. These two groups each participated in 
20 auctions in each of cells IV. V, and VI. 
Each experiment was conducted in the following way. The eight experimental 
subjects were each given a folder containing a list of valuations, five information 
and record sheets (one for each market year, fi ve bidding forms (one for each 
market year), and a three-page instruction booklet. At the beginning of the 
experiment, the experimenter read the instructions while the subjects followed 
along. In these instructions , the subjects were informed that the values of the 
210 items on their list of valuations were random draws , uniformly distributed 
over the range $0.00-$ 1. 99. In add ition they were told how to figure out the 
value of a bundle, how to keep records. how to bid, and how to calculate their 
profits . These simple instructions are given in the Appendix. After the instructions 
were read and questions were answered, a " practice" year took place which 
allowed the subjects to become accustomed to the rules and the recording format. 
No payoffs were made on the basis of outcomes of this practice year. During 
each real market year each buyer privately submitted to the experimenter written 
bids for each of the 18 auctions in which the buyer was competing during that 
year. When all eight buyers had submitted their bidding forms, the experimenter 
announced the highest and the second highest bids in each of the 48 auctions 
that year. This information was posted so that all subjects could study the 
information if they wished. Subjects recorded their profit for each auction in 
which they had participated and then proceeded to the next market year. 
To summarize the design, there were three experiments in which a total of 
720 auctions were conducted. Perhaps the most important aspect of the design 
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is that each bundled auction corresponds in a very carefully planned way with 
some set of separate auctions. Because of this. items are essentially sold three 
times: once in a single-item auct ion; once in a two-item bundled auction; and 
once in a four-item bundled auction. This fac ilitates the analysis of the experi -
mental data tremendously by making it possible to use relatively simple stati st ical 
techniques to test the predictions. These techniques, along with the results of 
the statistical tests, are described in the nex t two sections. 
IV. HYPOTHESES 
This section lists spec ific testable hypotheses which are stated in a form that 
allows the data from the experimental auctions to be brought to bear directly on 
the validity of the propositions of Section II. For each hypothesis, two types of 
tests are made at two levels of aggregation. First. three comparisons are made , 
one for each of the three series of experiments, between the results of bundled 
and separate auctions. Second, aggregate comparisons are also made by pooling 
the data from all three series of experiments. 
In order to test (P 1) using the experimental data , comparisons are made be-
tween average revenues from auctions in ce ll s I. II , and II I of Table 1. Specif-
ically, the statistical hypotheses which are tested using both aggregated and 
disaggregated data are the following: 
(H 1.1) The sample mean of differences between revenues generated by 11vo 
item auctions in cell I/ and s11111s of revenues generated in the corresponding 
single-item auelions of cell I is significantly greater than zero. 
(H 1.2) The sample mean of differences between revenues generated byfour-
i1e111 auctions in cell Ill and the sums of rel'enues generated in the corre-
~ponding single-item auelions of cell I is significantly greater than :ero. 
(HI .3) The sample mean of differences between revenues generated by fv11r-
i1e111 auctions in cell Ill and sums of revenues generated in the corresponding 
single item auctions <~f cell I is significantly greater than the sample mean 
of differences between revenues generated by 1wv-i1e111 auelions in cell If 
and sums of revenues generated in the corresponding single-item aue1ions 
of cell I. 
The following spec ific hypotheses are used to test prediction (P2): 
(H2. I) The sample mean of differences between revenues generated by twv-
item auctions in cell V and sums of revenues generated in the corresponding 
single-item auction of cell IV is significantly less than zero. 
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(H2.2) The sample mean of differences between revenues generated by four-
item auctions in cell VI and sums of revenues generated in the corresponding 
single-item auctions of cell IV is significantly less than : ero. 
(H2.3) The sample mean of differences between revenues generated by four-
item auctions in cell VI and sums of revenues generated in the corresponding 
two-item auctions of cell Vis significantl_v less than zero. 
Prediction (P3) is tested by the following three hypotheses: 
(H3. l) The sample mean of revenues generated by auctions in cell I is 
significantly less than the sample mean of revenues generated by auctions 
in cell IV. 
(H3.2) The sample mean of revenues generated by auctions in cell II is 
significantly less than the sample mean of revenues generated by auctions 
in cell V. 
(H3.3) The sample mean of revenues generated by auctions in cell Ill is 
significantly less than the sample mean of revenues generated by auctions 
in cell VI. 
The testing of (P4)-(P8) predictions about the distributional consequences of 
bundling, involves a slightly more involved analysis. In each auction in each of 
ce lls II , Ill , V, and VI , each buyer is categorized according to the magnitude 
of his valuation of items in the bundle and the variation of his valuations of 
items in the bundle. Specifically, three categories of magnitude (high, medium, 
and low) are constructed and three categories of variation (high, medium, and 
low) are constructed. This divides the buyers in each auction in ce lls II , Ill , V, 
and VI into nine categories with approximately equal numbers of buyers in each 
category. This classification is illustrated in Table 2 where each category is 
labeled for future reference. Entries fo r each category are minus the difference 
Table 2. Categorization of Buyers According to Magnitude and Variation of 
Valuations for Items in a Bundle 
Varimio11 of Va/umions 
HiKh Medium Low 
HiKh A D G 
Magniwde 
B E of Medium H 
Va!tu11io11s 
Loll' c F J 
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between the mean surplus for buyers in that category in a bundled auction and 
the mean sum of surpluses for buyers in that category in the corresponding 
separate auctions.~ 
The predictions we wish to test address questions about the ex ante distribut ion 
of buyer surplus , not the ex post distribution of buyer surplus . That is, we wish 
to investigate how the expected surplus a buyer receives varies as a function o f 
the seller' s bundling decision and that buyer's set of item valuations. Because 
each individual subject participates in only l 0 or 20 auctions in each cell , typically 
there are only two or three observations for a g iven subject in each of the nine 
categories for each cell .This was judged to be too small a number of observations 
to permit meaningful statist ical analysis of expected surpluses at the individual 
level. Instead, in each category of each cell, observations are obtained pooling 
across alt individual subjects in an experiment. 
The fo llowing statistical hypothesis is tested to determine the validity of the 
prediction (P4); again, as in earlier hypotheses, each buyer in each auction is 
treated as a separate case: 
(H4.I) In auctions from cells II and Ill , entries for all categories, A, B, C, 
D, E, F , C, H, and J , are significantly greater than zero. 
The following stati stical hypothesis is tested to determine the val idity of pre-
dic tion (P5): 
(HS. I) Entries for all categories in cell II are each sign!ficamfy fess than 
the corresponding entries for all categories in cell Ill. 
The following stati stical hypotheses are tested to determine the validity of 
prediction (P6): 
(H6.I) Entries for categories A, B, C. D, E, F. H. and Jin cells V and VI 
are each significantly greater than zero. 
(H6.2) The entry for category C in cells V and VI is significantly fess than 
zero . 
(H6.3) Entries for categories A, B, C, D , E . F, H, and J in cell V are each 
significantly fess than the corresponding entries in cell VI . 
(H6.4) Entries for category C in cell V are significantly greater (fess neg-
ative ) than the corresponding entry in cell VI . 
The hypotheses designed to test prediction (P7 ) are the following: 
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(H7.l) In cells II , Ill , V, and VI, the entries in categories D , £ , and Fare 
significantly less than the entries in categories A, B, and C. respectively. 
(H7.2) In cells II, Ill , V, and VI , the entries in categories G, H. and J are 
significantly less than the entries in categories A, B. and C. respectively . 
(H7.3) In cells II , /II , V, and VI. the entries in categories G. H, and J are 
significantly less than the entries in categories D, £. and F, respectively. 
The hypotheses designed to test prediction (P8) are the fol lowing: 
(HS.I ) In cells II , /II, V, and VI, the entries in categories B. £,and Hare 
significantly greater than the entries in categories A, D. and G, re~pectively. 
(H8.2) In cells II , Ill, V, and VI, the entries in categories B , £, and Hare 
significantly greater than the entries in categories C. F, and J, respectively. 
To facilitate analysis of prediction (P9), " bid di fferences" are calculated. A 
bid difference equals a buyer's bid for a bundle minus the sum of that buyer's 
bids in the separate single-item auctions for items contained in the bundle. The 
hypotheses designed to test prediction (P9) are the following: 
(H9. I) The sample mean of the bid differences between cells I and II is 
significantly greater than zero . 
(H9.2) The sample mean of the bid differences bet111ee11 cells I and Ill is 
significantly greater than zero. 
(H9.3) The sample mean of the bid differences bet111een cells I and II is 
significantly less than the sample mean of the bid differences between cells 
I and /II . 
Hypotheses (H9. l) through (H9.3) are tested at three different levels of aggre-
gation: the individual level; the experiment level (aggregat ing the behavior of 8 
buyers); and the fully aggregated l ~ve l (aggregating the behavior of 24 buyers) . 
For each auction, efficiency is measured by the valuation of the winning bidder 
divided by the sum of the highest valuation of each of the separate items being 
sold in the auction. In other words, we measure efficiency as the percentage of 
maximum possible total surplus. For each auction in cells II , III , V, VI. an 
efficiency difference is calculated which equals the percentage of maximum total 
surplus in separate auctions minus the percentage of maximum total surplus in 
the corresponding bundled auction. The following hypotheses were des igned to 
test prediction (PI 0): 
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(HlO. l) The sample mean efficiencv differences in cells II , Ill . V, and VI 
are each signijicamly greater than zero. 
(Hl0.2) The sample mean efficiency dijjerence in cell III is significantly 
greater than the sample mean efficiency difference in cell If . 
(H 10.3) The sample mean efficiency difference in cell VI is significant Ir 
greater than the sample mean eficiency difference in cell V. 
In this section, 26 testable hypotheses were outlined. The next section presents 
the results of the experimental auctions. Some concluding remarks are made in 
Section YI. 
V. DATA 
The data support the hypotheses about the effect of bundling on seller revenue. 
The mean revenue differences for each experiment as well as the pooled mean 
revenue differences for all three experiments combined are given in Table 3. 
There is weak support for hypotheses (HI. I ), (H 1. 2), and (H 1. 3) but the sta-
ti stical tests fo r the pooled mean revenue differences between cells I. II. and Ill 
are not signi fican t at the 10% leve l. ' However, these pooled means have the 
Table 3. Revenue Differences Attributable to Bundling" 
Experi111e111 
I 
cell II cell I 1.9 - (5 0) 
cell Il l - ce ll I 12.9* (9 .3) 
cell Ill cell II 11 .0 - ( 10.6) 
cd l V - cell IV - 23.2*** (4.4) 
cel l YI - cell IV 
- 57 . 7*** 
(5 .7) 
cell YI cell Y - 34.5*** - (7 .2) 
" Standard errors arc in paren theses. 
• Signilicant at 1ork le vel. 
** Si~ni lirant al 5% level. 
*** Si~nificant at I "k level. 
Exp<'ri111e111s 
Experiment Experiment 1-J 
2 3 (pooled) 
13.9*** -8.5 2.5 
(3.8) (5 .6) (2.9) 
11.5** - 13.3 3.7 
(6.3) (6 2) (4.3) 
- 2.4 -4.8 1.2 
(7.4) (8.4) (5.2) 
- 13.2** - 19.0*** - 18.5*** 
(6.0) (4.0) (2 8) 
- 51.2*** - 58.5*** -55 .8*** 
( 10.6) (6.7) (4.6) 
- 39 .0*** - 39.5*** -37.3*** 
( 12.2) (7 8) (5.4) 
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right sign in each case. So in the three experiments conducted , on average the 
seller was better off bundling when there were two buyers . but not significantly 
better off. 
The data offer very strong evidence that supports hypotheses (H2. I), (H2.2), 
and (H2.3). When we use a one-tailed test, all three of the pooled mean differ-
ences have the right signs" and all are signi ficant at the I% level. In fact all of 
these mean di fferences in each of the three experiments are also significantly 
less than zero at either the 5% or the I% leve l. Thus we can state with a great 
deal of confidence that with four bidders the seller is worse off bundling. 
The prediction that seller revenue increases as a function of the number of 
bidders is also borne out by the data . Table 4 contains the revenue differences. 7 
In each experiment , the revenues in cells IV. Y. and YI were signi ficantly greater 
than the revenues in cell s I, II , and III , respecti vely. The significance level was 
I%. Thus hypotheses (H3. l ), (H3.2), and (H3.3) cannot be rejected . 
With few exceptions, the experiments supported the hypotheses about the 
distributional consequences of bundling. On average , most buyers were made 
signi ficantly worse off from bundling. Data for the individual experiments are 
given in Table 5. These differences' for all of the experiments pooled are sum-
marized in Table 6. 
In cell II , the major exceptions to the above statement are those buyers who 
have relati vely little vari ation in valuations for items in a bundle . In these 
exceptions, the signs of the observed mean surplus differences were almost 
always positive, but not significantly greater than zero at the I 0% level. In cell 
III , only categories G and H (again " low-variation" categories) failed to have 
signi ficantly positive surplus differences, but again the signs of these means were 
positive. Each individual experiment also supports these hypotheses. Because 
there were fewer data points (i.e .. fewer auctions). fewer categories showed 
Table 4. Revenue Differences Attributable to Number of Competing Buyers 
ce ll I - ce ll IV 
cell II - cell V 
ce ll Ill - cell VI 
t-valuc for 1- 1 V 
t-value for 11- V 
t-value for 111- VI 
*S ignificant at IO'k kvcl. 
**Signific~1111 at 5'A level. 
***Signilicanl al I 'k leve l. 
E.rperi111e111 
I 
-45 .925*** 
- 62. 725*** 
- 11 3. 100*** 
(6.6) 
(9.9) 
( 13.6) 
Experi111e111s 
E.rperi111e111 Expai111e111 1-3 
2 J (pooled) 
-29.825*** - 18.775*** -3 1.250*** 
- 29.025*** - 27 .025*** - 4 1 .598*** 
-53.500*** - 29.950*** -65.5 17*** 
(7 .5) (5.8) (3.9) 
( 11 .2) (9.8 ) (6. 2) 
( 14.5) ( 11.8) (8. 3) 
(YJ 
(YJ 
Table 5. Buyers' Mean Surplus Differences Attributable to Bundling (Experiments I , 2, 3)" 
£rpc1 rimnll I 
Cell Cell 
II Ill 
A 3.46 41.70* 
(7 .87) (28.22) 
B 20.00••• 57.00*** 
(7.70) ( 12.28) 
c 7.67 28.2 1 *** 
(6 29) (8.06) 
D 16. 14 9.86 
( 17.70) (27. 14) 
E 0 .0 5 1. 14** 
(0 .0 ) (24.25) 
F 4 . 10*** 25.80*** 
(1.43) (10.53) 
G - I 1.25 27.25 
(25.77) (65.71 ) 
H 1.20 7.00*** 
(19 .70) (0 .0) 
J - .08 3.92*** 
( .40) ( I .43) 
nStandard errors arc in parentheses. 
*S ignificant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at I% level. 
Cell 
v 
-.93 
(8 .24) 
20.65*** 
(5 . 17) 
10 .89*** 
(4. 16) 
-.28 
(8. I I) 
6 .69** 
(3 73) 
3.33* 
(2.32) 
- 16.00* 
( 10.43) 
- 10.25 
(5 .38) 
0 0 
(0 .0) 
Cc' // Cd/ 
VJ II 
3.39 23.7* 
( 12.26) ( I I. I) 
33.22*** 26.5*** 
(4 .22) (7 . I) 
34.64*** I I. I• • 
(9. 12) (4 .8) 
- 7.7 1 25 .6** 
(7. 83) ( 13.2) 
24.67** 1.7 
( 12.39) ( 1.7) 
7.29*** 4.5* 
(2.30) (2 .9) 
- 24.64* 17.3** 
( 17.82) (7 . 7) 
16. 83*** 0 .0 
(5 .58) (8.2) 
7. 82*** - 1.0 
(2.75) ( 1.0) 
Etp erimt•llf 2 Experimnll J 
Cell Cd/ Cell Cell Cell Cd/ 
Ill v VI II Ill v 
61 .8*** I 7.5*** 20.4*** 6.6 37.3*** - 4.9 
( I I .4) (6.8) (7 .2) ( 15.6) (14.0) ( 10.9) 
63 .3*** I 8. 7*** 41. 3*** 23.0*** 5 1.6*** 15.2*** 
(7. I> (3.6) (5. 7) (8.3) (6.3) (3.5) 
35.0*** I 2.3*** 24. I*** I I .0** 6 1 .6*** 8.2** * 
(9.2) (4.5) (4.6) (6.5) (7.7) (2.7) 
- 1.5 - 15.8 29 .6** -.5 27. I** - 32. 1 
( 10 .5) ( 10.4) ( 15.2) (9.2) (1 2. I) ( 13.7) 
32.3*** 9.0 25.6 6.7 2 1.0 2.3 
(1 0 .5) (9.0) (8. )) (6.7) (28.0) (2.8) 
42.3*** 1.4*** 1.5 2.5** 10.0 0.0 
( 15.8) ( .6) ( 1.5) ( I .4) (10.0) (0.0) 
12.5 2.3 -13 .0* 3.3 - 6.1 - 9 .8* 
(13.9) (7 . 7) ( 10. J) (9.9) (1 3.7) (6.3) 
- 22.0 - 2.4 10 . I* - 35.0 24.0*** 3.3 
(0.0) (2.0) (6 .7) (35 .0) (4.0) (2.7) 
14.0** 0.0 I .5** 2.6* 10. 1 *** 0.0 
(8 . 1) (0 0) (.7) (2.0) (2.8) (0.0) 
Cd/ 
VI 
28.7** 
(16.6) 
29.9*** 
(6.8) 
15.9*** 
(3 5) 
- 29.4 
( 17.0) 
9 .3* . 
(6.8) 
7.4** 
(3 .5) 
- 6.2 
(19 .2) 
6.4 
(5 .9) 
4 .2* 
(2.8) 
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Table 6. Buyers' Mean Surplus Differences Attributable to Bundling 
(All Experiments Pooled)" 
Cell II 
11 .2** 
A (6 .3) 
22.9*** 
B (4.4) 
10.3*** 
c (3.2) 
9 .8* 
D (7.4) 
3.6 
E (2.8) 
3.9*** 
F ( I . I ) 
6.5 
G (6.6) 
-4.9 
H (9.6) 
.6 
J (.7) 
"S t;rndard errors arc in parentheses. 
*Signi ficant at 10% level. 
*"Significant at S~ level. 
:t •*Sign ilicant at I <"k level. 
Cell Ill 
48 .3*** 
( 10 . 1) 
6 1.7*** 
(5.3) 
4 1.6*** 
(5.6) 
16.0* 
( 12.8) 
38.4*** 
( 10.9) 
28.9*** 
(7.9) 
2.8 
(113) 
8.3 
( 11.0) 
8. 1 *** 
(2. 1) 
Cell V Cell IV 
6.7* 17. 1*** 
(4.9) (6.7) 
18.5*** 35.2*** 
(2.5) (3. 1) 
10.3 *** 22.2*** 
(2. 1) (2.9) 
- 12.3 -4.4 
(6.2) (8 0) 
4.9** 19.2*** 
(2 3) (5 0) 
1.4** 6.0*** 
( 7) (1.7) 
- 7.8** - 13.4* 
(4 .5) ( 10.3) 
- 3. 1 10.5*** 
(2.4) (3.6) 
0.0 4 . 7*** 
(0.0) ( 1.4) 
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significantly pos1t1ve mean differences; however, most of these sample mean 
differences had the correct sign. Over all , the experiments strongly support 
hypothesis (H4. l ). which states that if there are two buyers any buyer is better 
off ex ante when the items are sold in separate auctions regardless of his valuations. 
The next hypothesis, (HS. I). states that, when there are two buyers, on average 
buyers are worse off the more items that are bundled together. Table 7 displays 
the sample mean surplus differences between cells II and III. In six of the nine 
categories, the hypothes is is supported at a I% significance level. The three 
exceptions are cell s D. G , and H. One should note that these are three categories 
for which such differences are pred icted to be quite small. Even so. two of these 
three categories had means of the predicted sign. Again the results strongly 
support the theoretical prediction. 
Hypotheses (H6. l), (H6.2) , and (H6.3) are very strongly supported by the 
data. In Table 6, categories A, B. C, E, and F have significantly positive entries 
in ce ll Y. In category J there were no observations other than 0 since none of 
~ 
Cl 
Table 7 . Comparison of Buyers' Mean Surplus Differences with Two-Item Bundles and Four-Item Bundles" 
Experiment I 
Cell II -
Ct' ll Ill 
A 38.2* 
(29.3) 
B 37 .O*** 
( 14.5) 
c 20.5** 
( 10 3) 
D 6.2 
(33 0) 
E 51. 1 ** 
(24 .3) 
F 21.7** 
( 10 .6) 
G 38.0 
(70 6) 
H 5 .8 
( 19 .7) 
J 4 .0*** 
( 1.5) 
</Standard error:-. art! in parentheses. 
*Significan t at 1orh level. 
**Signi ficant at 5% level. 
***Significa nt al I 'A level. 
Cell V -
Cell VI 
4. 3 
(14.8) 
12.6** 
(67) 
23. 7*** 
( 10.0) 
- 7.4 
(1 1.2) 
18.0* 
(12 9) 
4.0 
(3 3) 
- 8.6 
(20 6) 
27 . 1 *** 
(7.8) 
7 .8*** 
(2 8) 
Experi111e111 2 
Cell II - Cell V -
Cell Ill Cell VI 
38. 1*** 2.9 
( 15.9) (9.9) 
36.8*** 22.6*** 
( 10 OJ (67) 
23.9** 11 .8** 
( 10.4) (6.4) 
- 27 . 1 45 .4*** 
( 16.9) ( 18.4) 
30 .6*** 16.6* 
( 10 6) ( 12 I) 
37 .8*** . I 
( 16. 1) ( 1.6) 
-4.8 - 15.3 
(15.9) ( 12.7) 
-22.0 12.5** 
(8.2) (7.0) 
15.0** 1.5** 
(8 2) (.7) 
Experime/11 3 Experimellls 1- 3 (pooled ) 
Cell II - Cell V - Cell II - Cell V -
Cell Ill Cell VI Cell Ill Cell VI 
30. 7* 33.6** 37 .1 *** 8.4 
(2 1.0) ( 19.9) ( 11. 9) (8.3) 
28.6*** 14.7** 38.8*** 16. 7*** 
( 10.4) (7.6) (6.9) (4 0) 
50.6*** 7.7** 31 .3*** 11 .9*** 
( 10 I) (4.4) (6.4) (3.6) 
27 .6** 2. 7 6.2 7.9 
( 15.6) (2 1.8) ( 14.8) (10. 1) 
14 .3 7.0 34 .8*** 14.3*** 
(28.8) (7.4) ( 11.3) (5.5) 
7.5 7.4** 25.0*** 4.6*** 
( 10. 1) (3.5) (8 .0) ( 1.8) 
- 9.4 3.6 -3 .7 5.6 
( 16 9) (20.2) ( 13.1) ( 11.2) 
59.0** 3. 1 13.2 13.6*** 
(35.2 ) (6 5) (14.6) (4.3) 
7.5** 4.2* 7.5*** 4. 7*** 
(3.4) (2 .8) (2.2) ( 1.4) 
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these buyers won any separate or bundled auctions. Category D is a bit of an 
anomaly since it shows a significantly 11ega1ive sign. In cell YI , all categories 
except D have positive mean surplus differences and they are significant. Cat-
egory D is negati ve but not significant. The data from individual experiments 
(Table 5) are also supporti ve of hypothesis (H6. l ), but fewer categories are 
significant due to larger standard errors resulting from a smaller sample size. 
Thus we conclude that (H6. I) is strongly supported by the data with the exception 
of category D. 
Hypothesis (H6.2) predicts that in cells V and VI the entry for category G 
should be significantly less than zero. In the pooled data, this is confirmed. This 
is also confirmed in the individual experiments (Table 5) in the four cases in 
which the sign of the sample mean is significant. 
Hypothesis (H6.3) is supported in all categories except A and D, and hy-
pothesis (H6.4) is not supported (refer to Table 7). Again, with few exceptions 
this indicates that predictions for most categories are qualitatively very precise. 
This also appears to be true when we are using the data from the three experiments 
individually instead of pooled. The signs are generally correct in the individual 
experiments , but are not always significant because of a small sample problem. 
Tables 8 and 9 display the summarized data9 used to test hypotheses (H7 .1 ), 
(H7.2), and (H7.3). Using the pooled data (Table 9), hypothesis (H7. I) was 
strongly supported in all cells and for all categorical comparisons except for the 
comparison of categories A and D in cell II. Once again the sign was correct 
but not significant at the I 0% level. Hypothesis (H7 .2) was significantly sup-
ported with one exception: the sign for the comparison between categories A 
and G was correct but not significant. Hypothesis (H7 .3) was also supported by 
the pooled data, but the evidence was not as convincing as the evidence sup-
porting (H7. I) and (H7.2) . In all four cells, the mean surplus difference between 
categories D and G were not significantly different. This was also true for the 
comparison of categories E and H in cell lll and the comparison of F and J in 
cell YI. All other signs were correct and significant at the I 0% level. 
Table 8 shows the sample means and standard errors used to test hypotheses 
(H7. I) , (H7 .2), and (H7.3) in each of the three experiments. These data also 
offer similar support for these three hypotheses, but the support is not as strong 
because fewer signs are significant due to the smaller sample size. From Tables 
8 and 9 we conclude that (H8. I) , (H8.2), and (H8. 3) cannot be rejected . 
The next set of hypotheses, (H8. l) and (H8. 2), are tested by comparing sample 
means of buyers' surplus differences along the dimension of the magnitude of 
the buyers' valuations for items in a bundle. Table 10 contains the data for each 
separate experiment, and Table 11 contains the data pooled from all three ex-
periments. For all experiments combined, the signs of the differences were 
significantly positive, as predicted for all categories in cell YI. In cell V, four 
of the six categorical comparisons had signs which were significant and consistent 
with the hypothesis . The exceptions were the differences between categories G 
'° N 
Table 8. Comparison of Buyers' Mean Surplus Differences Along the Dimension of Variation of Values 
(Experiments I , 2, and 3)" 
Expc·rimt•111 I 
Cell c,,11 
II Ill 
A-D - 12 .7 3 1.8 
( 19.4) (39 . 1) 
B- E 20.0*** 5.9 
(7 , 7) (27.2) 
C- F 3.6 2.4 
(6.5) ( 13.3) 
A-G 14 .7 14.4 
(27 .0) (71.5) 
B-H 18.8 50.0*** 
(21.2) ( 12.3) 
C- J 7.8 25.3*** 
(6.3) (8.2) 
D- G 27.4 - 17.35 
(31.3) (7 1. 1) 
E- H - 1.2 44. I** 
( 19.7) (24.3) 
F-J 4.2*** 21.9** 
( 1. 5) (10.6) 
1.1Standard errors arc in parentheses. 
*Significant al 10% level. 
**Significant al 5% leve l. 
***S ignificant at I% leve l. 
Cd/ 
v 
- .6 
( 11.5) 
13.95** 
(6.4) 
7.6* 
(4.8) 
15. 1 
( 13 .2) 
30 .9*** 
(7.5) 
10.9 
(4.2) 
15.7 
( 13.2) 
11 .o••• 
(6.5) 
3.3* 
(2.3) 
Cell c,,11 
VI II 
IO.I - 1.9 
( 14.6) ( 17 .2) 
8.5 24 .8*** 
( 13. I) (7.3 ) 
27 .3*** 6.6 
(9.4) (5.6) 
28.0 6.5 
(21 .6) (13 .5) 
16.4*** 26.5*** 
(7 0) ( 10.8) 
26.8*** 12. I*** 
(9 .5) (4 9) 
16.9 8.4 
( 19.4) I 15.3) 
7 .9 1.7 
( 13.6) (8.4) 
-.5 5.5** 
(3 6) (3 I) 
l:."xperiml'lll 2 Experiment 3 
Cl'il Cd/ Cd/ c,,11 Cell Cell 
Ill v VI II Ill v 
63.3*** 33.3*** - 9 .3 7. 1 IO. I 27.2** 
( 15.5) ( 12.4) (16.8) (18. I) (18 .8) ( 17 .5) 
47.0*** 9 .7 15. 7* 16.3* 30.7 12. 9*** 
( 12.7) (9 7) (9.9) (10 7) (28.7) (4.5) 
- 7.3 10.9*** 22.6*** 8.5 51.6*** 8 .2*** 
( 18.3) (4.5) (4.8) (6.6) (12.6) (2 . 7) 
49.3*** - 15.2* 33.4*** 3.3 43.4** 4 .8 
( 18 .0) ( 10 2) ( 12.4) (1 8.5) ( 19.6) ( 12.6) 
9 1.3*** 2 1. I 31. 2*** 58.0* 27 . 7*** 11.8*** 
(7 . I) (4. I} (9.0) (36.0) (7 .5) (4 .4) 
21.0•• 12.3*** 22.6*** 8.4 51.5*** 8.2*** 
( 12.3 ) (4.5 ) (4.7) (6.8) (8.2) (2.7) 
- 14.0 - 18. I 42.6*** - 3.8 33.3** - 22.3 
( I 7.4) ( 12 9) ( 18 .2) ( 13.5) (1 8.6) ( 15 . I) 
54.0*** 11.4 15.5* 4 1. 7 - 3.0 - I.I 
( 10 .5) (9 .2) (10 .7) (35 .6) (28 .3) (3 .9) 
28.3* 1.4*** 0 .0 -. I -. I 0 .0 
( 17.8) ( .6) (I .7) (2.4) (10.4) (0.0) 
Cell 
VI 
58.2*** 
(23.8) 
20.5** 
(9 .6) 
8.5** 
(4.9) 
35.0* 
(25.4) 
23.4*** 
(9.0) 
11. 7*** 
(4.5) 
- 23.2 
(25.6) 
2.9 
(9.0) 
3.2 
(4 .5) 
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Table 9. Comparison of Buyers ' Mean Surplus Differences Along the 
Dimension of Variation of Values (All Experiments Pooled)" 
Cell II 
A- D 1.3 
(9.7) 
B-E 19.4*** 
(5.2) 
C- F 6.4** 
(3.4) 
A- G 4 .7 
(9 . 1) 
B- 1-1 27.9*** 
( 10.6) 
C-J 9.7*** 
(:\.3) 
D-G 3.3 
(9.9) 
E- 1-1 8.5 
( 10.0) 
F-J 3.3*** 
( 1.3) 
''S1andanJ error~ arc in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10<',f level . 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at IC"/" level. 
Cell Ill 
32.3** 
( 16.3) 
23.3** 
( 12.1 ) 
12.7* 
(9 7) 
45 .6* ** 
( 15.2 ) 
53.5*** 
( 12.2) 
33.5** 
(6.0) 
13.3 
( 17.1) 
30. 1 ** 
( 15 .5) 
20.8*** 
(8 2) 
Cell V Cell IV 
19.0*** 2 1.5** 
(7.9) (10.4) 
13.5*** 16.0*** 
(3.4) (5 .9) 
8.9*** 16.3*** 
(2 .2) (3.2) 
14.6** 30.5*** 
(6.7) ( 12.3) 
21.6*** 24.8* ** 
(3 5) (4 .8) 
10.3*** 17.6*** 
(2. 1) (3.2) 
- 4.5 9. 1 
(7.7) (13.0) 
8. 1 *** 8.8* 
(3 3) (6.2 ) 
1.4** 1.3 
(.7) (2.2) 
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and H and the differences between categories H and J. Considering that the 
entries in Table 2 for each of the three, G , H, and J , are predicted by theory to 
be quite small. the fact that the differences between the entries in these three 
categories were not significantly different from zero is not particularly surprising. 
In cell s II and Ill combined , only 4 of the 12 signs were significant . All of these 
signs conformed with the predicted signs. Table 10 also shows that if each 
experiment is analyzed separately, an overwhelming proportion of the categorical 
comparisons have the predicted sign and a large number have not only the 
predicted sign but are also sign ificant. 
In all of the hypotheses making comparisons between the nine categories, 
(H4. I )- (H8.2), the tests have shown more significant comparisons when there 
are fo ur bidders (cells Y and YI) than when there are two bidders (cell s II and 
Ill ). There is a good reason for this. The comparisons in cells Y and YI have 
twice as many observations as the comparisons in cell s II and Ill since there are 
four bidders instead of two bidders. This results in larger standard errors of the 
'° 
.,. 
Table JO . Comparison of Buyers' Mean Surplus Differences Along the Dimension of Magnitude of Values 
(Experiments I , 2, and 3) 
Expt•riml'nl I 
Cd/ Cell 
II Ill 
13- A 16.5* 15.3 
(1 1.0) 130 .8) 
E- D - lti. l 41.2 
( 17 .71 (36.4) 
H- G 12.S - 20 .2 
132.5) (65.7) 
B- C l 2.3 28.8** 
(9 .9) ( )4 .7) 
E- F - 4 . 1 25.3 
( 1.4) 126.5) 
H- J 1..1 J. I** 
119 .7) ( 1.4) 
"Standard errors arc in parcnlhc~c~. 
*Sig.nili c.:ant at 1or4 k vcl. 
**Signi licant at 5".4 level. 
,,. ... *Signifkalll al I 'ff le vel. 
Cell 
v 
21.S** 
(9 .7) 
7.0 
(8.9) 
5 .8 
11 1.7) 
9.7* 
(6 .7 ) 
.1.4 
14.4) 
- )0 .25 
15.4 1 
Cell Cd/ 
\II II 
29.8** 2.8 
11 .1 .0) 11 3.2) 
32.4 ** - 23.9 
114.6) l l:U) 
41 .4** - 17.3 
118.7 ) ( 11. 2) 
- 1.4 15.4** 
( 10.0) (8 .0) 
17.4* - 2.8 
11 2.61 (1.4) 
9.0• 1.0 
l(d) 18.3) 
Experimt'111 2 Exp<•rimel// J 
Cell Cd/ Ct'll C<·ll Cd/ Cd/ 
Ill v VI II Ill v 
7.6 1.2 21.0** 16.4 14 .4 20 . I** 
113.4 ) c7 . 7) <9.2 ) 117 .7) 115.4) ( 11.4) 
33 .X** ~-l . 8** - 4.0 7.2 - 6 . 1 .14 .3*** 
114 .X) 11 .1.8) ( 17 .2) 111.4) (10 .7) ( 14.0) 
- 34.5 - 4.7 2J. J •• -38.3 JO. I** 13. I** 
( 13.9) (8.0) 112 .3) (36.4) 114 .3) 16.9) 
34.3*** 6.4 17 .2*** 12.0 - 9.9 6 .9 * 
( 11.6) 15.8) (7.3 ) ( 10.5) 19.9) 14.4) 
-9.9 7.6 24 .1 **"' 4 .2 11.0 2.3 
()9.0) 19.0) IX.2) 16.8) 129. 7) (2.8) 
-.16.0 - 2.4 8.6 - .17.6 13.9*** 3 . .1 
(8 . 1) 12.01 17 .01 <35.11 (4.9) (2.71 
Cell 
VI 
5X.5*** 
117 9) 
38. 7*** 
118 .. 1) 
12.6 
120. 1) 
13.9** 
c7 .6) 
1.9 
(7 .6) 
2.2 
(6 5) 
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Tobie 11. Comparison of Buyers' Mean Surplus Differences Along the 
Dimension of Magnitude of Values (All Experiments Pooled)" 
Cell II 
B- A 11. 7* 
(7.7) 
E- D - 6.2 
(7.9) 
H- G - 10.4 
( I 1.6) 
B-C 12.6** 
(5.4) 
E-F - .3 
(3.0) 
H- J - 5.5 
(9. 6) 
'
1Standard errors arc in parentheses. 
*Signilicant at I Q<'fc le vel. 
"*Significa nt at S'a level. 
***Significant at I 'h le vel. 
Cell Ill 
13.4 
( 11.4) 
22 .4* 
( 16.8) 
5.5 
( 15.8) 
20. I*** 
(7 7) 
9 .5 
( 13.5) 
. I 
( 11 .2) 
Cell V Cell IV 
11. 7** 18. 1 *** 
(5 5) (7.4) 
17 .3*** 23 .6*** 
(66) (9.4) 
4.7 23.9** 
(5. 1) (10.9) 
8.2*** 13.0*** 
(3.3) (4 .2) 
3.6* 13.3*** 
(2 .4) (5.3) 
-3. 1 5.8* 
(2 .4) (3. 9) 
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estimated mean differences in ce ll s II and Ill than in cells V and VI , so that one 
would expect fewer of the signs to be significant. 
In addi tion to the above tests of expected surplus differences it is also possible 
to calculate exactly for each bidder in each auction the ex post surplus predicted 
by the theoretical model of bidding behavior. These calculated numbers can then 
be compared to the actual surpluses buyers received. enabling us to examine the 
effect of bundling on ex post surplus differences. Such comparisons do not test 
any of the propositions stated in Section II , above, but they are of interest insofar 
as they relate to open theoretical and empirical questions about individual bidding 
behavior. Thus, fo r the sake of completeness. these comparisons were made and 
are reported here. For each bidder in each bundled auction. a theoretical surplus 
difference was predicted by subtracting the theoretical surplus for that bidder in 
that auction from the theoretical surplus in the corresponding separate auctions. 
The signs ( +, 0 , - ) of these differences were then compared to the signs of 
the actual surplus differences. Table 12 reports the proportion of correctly pre-
dicted signs for each cell in each experiment. Using binomial tests , theory predicts 
the signs significantly better than a model in which signs are predicted by ran-
domly choosing one of the three signs ( +. 0 , or - ). However, if we use a 
similar binomial test, all proportions are significantly less than I according to 
any reasonable statistical criterion. These results lead us to conclude that, while 
the ex ante (on average) effects of bundling on the distribution of buyer surplus 
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Table 12 . Proportion of Signs of Surplus Differences 
Predicted Correctl y by the Model" 
Cc·// II - Cell Ill - Cell V - Cell VI -
Celli Celli Cd/ IV Cell IV 
Experimcnl I .60 .63 .68 .61 
(80) (80) ( 160) ( 160) 
Experiment 2 .59 .80 .78 .75 
(80) (80) ( 160) ( 160) 
Experiment 3 .73 .76 .75 .66 
(80) (80) ( 160) ( 160) 
All experiments .63 . 73 .74 .67 
pooled (240) (240) 1480) (480) 
uNurnbcrs of observations arc in parentheses. 
Table 13. Mean Bid Differences (by Individual Buyers)" 
Cell II - Cell Ill - Cell Ill -
Buyer Number Cell I Cell I Cell II 
5.6 55 .3*** 49. 7*** 
I (5.6) (8.0) (9.8) 
16.5** 9.3 - 7.2 
2 (7.7) ( 11 .0) ( 13.4) 
2. 1 * 3.6*** 1.5 
3 (1.3) (1.4) ( 1.9) 
.8 8.6 7.8 
4 (2.0) (9 2) (9.4) 
14.4*** 56.2*** 4 1.8*** 
5 (4.0) (7. 3) (8.3) 
6.8 49 .6*** 42.8** 
6 ( 11.0) ( 19.3) (22.2) 
4.4 32.8*** 28.4*** 
7 (5.3) (7.2) (8.9) 
12 .8*** 50 .0*** 37. 2** 
8 (4.9) ( 18.7) (19 3) 
19.0** 7 1.2*** 52.2*** 
9 (8.5) (7 .9) ( 11.6) 
26. I*** 77.5*** 51.4*** 
IO (7.3) (15 6) ( 17.2) 
5.5 32.5*** 27 .O*** 
II (6.4) (7. 1) (9.6) 
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Table 13 . (coll/.) Mean Bid Differences (by Individual Buyers)" 
Cell II -
811yu Number Cell I 
38.6*** 
12 (7.9) 
14.1 * 
13 (9.0) 
4.0 
14 (4.9) 
11.5*** 
15 (2.8) 
36.7*** 
16 ( 13 5) 
17.0*** 
17 (4.7) 
5.1 
18 (5.3) 
- 5.0 
19 ( 17. 1) 
17.0** 
20 (7.6) 
6.4 
2 1 ( 12.0) 
2 1. 7* ** 
22 (6 8) 
3.2 
23 (4.2) 
13.4 
24 ( II . I ) 
"Stant.lard errors arc in parcnthe!iiCS. 
*Signilkanl •ll 107c level. 
**Significant at 5% le vel. 
***Signifk;mt :.it I <'fl le vel. 
Cell Ill - Cell Ill -
Cell I Cell II 
122.2**" 83 .6*** 
( 13.4) ( 15 6) 
16 .0* 1.9 
( 11 .5) (14.6) 
54.0*** 50.0*** 
( 11 .2) ( 12 2) 
21 .o••• 15.5*** 
(4 .5) (5 .3) 
126.6*** 89.9*** 
(12 .3) ( 18.3) 
77.0*** 60.0*** 
(5.5) (7 .2) 
11 .6 6.5 
( 15 . I) (16.0) 
19.7* 24.7 
( 13.2) (21.6) 
46 .2*** 29.2*** 
(9.8) ( 12.4) 
46. 3*** 39.9*** 
(9 .7) ( 15.4) 
47 .8** 26. 1 ** 
( 11 .4) ( 13.3) 
19 .9*** 16.7** 
(5 8) (7.2) 
46.5*** 33. 1 ** 
(9 .5) (14.6) 
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is predicted quite accurately by the model , actual surplus fo r a particular bidder 
in a particular auction is predicted less accurately. 
The next set of hypotheses, (H9. l )-(H9.3), addresses the question of super-
additivity of buyers' bidding strategies. Table 13 displays these data for individual 
buyers. Since there were three experiments, there were 24 buyers in all. Each 
entry is an average measure of superadditivity from a specific buyer. Each row 
corresponds to a different buyer, and each column corresponds to an average 
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Table 14 . Mean Bid Differences (by Experiment)" 
Cell II -
Cell I 
Experiment I 
Ex periment 2 
Experiment 3 
'
1Standard errors arc in p<1rcn1hcscs. 
*Signilicnnt at 1oc4 le vel. 
**Sign ificant at 5% level. 
***Signilit.:ant al I 'it- k vcl. 
7.9 *** 
(2. 1) 
19.4*** 
(3. 1) 
9 .9*** 
(3.4) 
Cell Ill -
Cell I 
JJ.2* ** 
(4.6) 
65 .9*** 
(5 8) 
39 .4*** 
(4.2) 
Cell Ill -
Cell II 
25.3*** 
(5 . 1) 
46.5*** 
(6.6) 
29.5*** 
(5.4) 
difference between an individual' s bids in bundled auctions from one cell and 
sums of that individual' s bids in the corresponding unbundled auctions in another 
cell. Positive entries indicate superadditivity, and negati ve entries indicate sub-
additivity. As one can see, nearly all entries (70 out of 72) are pos itive , as 
predicted. In fac t 39 of the 72 entries in the table are significant ly positive at 
the I% level. Note that column I corresponds to (H9. I), column 2 corresponds 
to (H9.2), and column 3 corresponds to (H9.3). Referring to column I. note 
also that 13 of the 24 buyers satisfy hypothesis (H9. I) at the I 0% significance 
level and all but one of the remaining 11 buyers bid superadditively but not 
significantly superadditi ve ly. The other hypotheses are even more strongly sup-
ported by this table . There is not a single entry which is signi ficant ly less than 
zero even at a significance level of 15%. Of the few negati ve entries, none is 
more than one standard error less than zero. What is remarkable is that so many 
entries in this table are significantly posit ive even though the sample size for 
each entry is only 10. In Table 14 , bid differences are averaged across all bidders 
by experiment. When this aggregation is performed , all entries are significantly 
positive at the I% leve l. The data clearly confirm hypotheses (H9 . l )-(H9.3) 
beyond much doubt. 
A fina l observat ion about individual bidding behavior should be noted. Buyers 
did not always bid exactl y according to bidding strategies specified by the theory. 
This observation was also made by Coppinger et al. ( 1980) on the basis of their 
experimental data. 10 The fact that. despite this, the predictions from the theory 
about the aggregate effects of bundling decisions were strongly supported by the 
experiments described in the presen t paper ind icates that predictions of th is sort 
are qu ite robust. Nonetheless . this phenomenon points to a weakness in the 
theory of individual bidding behav ior which deserves to be explored in future 
research endeavors. 
The fina l se t of hypotheses, (H 10. 1)-(H1 0.3). addresses the loss of efficiency 
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Table 15. Mean Efficiency Differences" 
Celli -
Cd/ II 
Experiment I 4.6** * 
( I. 7) 
Experiment 2 6.o••• 
(2.0) 
Experiment 3 8.5*** 
(2.2) 
All ex periment~ 6.4*** 
pooled ( I.I ) 
"Stam.lard arors me in parentheses. 
*Sig.nificanl al IO'h level. 
**Signi fil.:~1111 at S'h leve l. 
***Signilkant at J 9( level. 
c,.111 -
Ci'// Ill 
9. 1 *** 
(2. 11 
14.4*** 
( 1.7) 
11.6*** 
( 1.7) 
11. 7*** 
( I.I > 
c,.1111 - Cell IV -
(°<,11111 Ct•// \I 
-t.5** 1.1.7**' 
(2.7) (2. 1) 
8.-t*** 13 . 7*** 
(2.6) (2.7) 
3 .. \ 6.4*** 
(2.8) ( 1.7) 
5.J*** 11 .3*** 
( 1.5) ( l.J) 
Table 16. Average Efficiencies 
Cell I Cell II Cell Ill Cell IV 
Expcrimcnl I .97 1 .929 .887 .966 
Experiment 2 .965 .9 13 .829 .979 
Experime nt 3 .996 .9 11 .881 .963 
All experiments 
pooled .977 .9 18 .866 .969 
c,.11 1v -
Cell VJ 
18.5*** 
( I .X) 
2 1.J*** 
(1.9) 
16. 1 *** 
( 1.7) 
18. 7••• 
Cl.0) 
Cell V 
.830 
.84 1 
.899 
.857 
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Ct•// V -
Ct•// \II 
4 .X** 
(2 .8) 
7 .6*** 
(.1.J) 
9.7*** 
(2.4) 
7.4*** 
11.6 ) 
Cell VI 
.782 
.765 
.802 
.783 
due to bundling. Table 15 presents average effi ciency differences between cells 
for each experiment and for all experiments pooled. The effic iency measure used 
was the percentage of maximum total surplus that was generated by the auction. 
The average effic iency difference between two cells is equal to the average 
difference between the percentage of maximum surplus generated in separate 
auctions and the percentage of maximum surplus generated in the corresponding 
bundled auction. 11 The evidence presented in Table 15 overwhelmingly supports 
(H I 0. 1-(H I 0. 3). Bundling creates ineffic iencies. Average efficiencies 1 ~ for each 
ce ll of each experiment are given in Table 16. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This series of experiments was designed and carried out with the aim of providing 
data to statistically test a number of spec ific predictions generated by a theoretical 
model. The predictions tested were qualitative in nature and addressed questions 
of the effect of bundling and the effect of the number of competing bidders on 
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seller re venues, the ex ante distribution of buyer surplus, the strateg ies of the 
buyers, and the ex post distribution of total surplus (i.e., effic iency) . The fol-
lowing predictions were strongly supported by the data: 
1. Seller revenues increase as a funct ion of the number of bidders. 
2. Buyers bid superadditively. 
3. When there are a large number (four or more) of bidders, the seller is 
better off not bundling. 
4. Bundling creates significant inefficiencies. 
5. On average, buyers with relatively more dispersed valuations are affected 
more adversely under bundling than are buyers with relatively less dis-
persed valuations. 
6. Ex ante, buyers are affected adversely by bundling. 
7. If there are a large number (four or more) of bidders, then buyers with 
exceptionally high valuation benefit , on average , from bundling. 
Two other predictions were supported by the data , but not so convincingly as 
the above predictions: 
8. With few competing bidders, the seller is better off bundling. 
9. On average, buyers with mediocre valuations are affected more adversely 
by bundling than buyers with relatively high or relatively low valuations. 
APPENDIX: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
General lnstructio11s 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various 
research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions , you might earn 
a considerable amount of money. Your earnings wi ll be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment . In addition, you will also be paid $3 .00 at the end 
of the experiment for your participation . 
In this experiment we are going to conduct auctions in which you wi ll be 
buying items from the experimenter. You will participate in several such auctions 
in a sequence of 5 market years. In your fo lder you will find an information and 
record sheet for each market year, as wel l as a " list of valuations. " These will 
determine the amount you will be paid if you win an auction. You are not to 
reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
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Specific Instructions 
During each market year, several auctions are conducted for several lots. Each 
lot consists of one or more items. At the beginning of each year, you will be 
asked to submit private, written bids for each of the lots listed in the fi rst column 
of your information and record sheet. These bids must be in penny increments. 
You have been provided with bidding forms for this purpose. Each lot consists 
of the set of items listed in column 2. You will also be told how many of the 
people in the room (including yourself) will be bidding on each lot. This number 
is listed in the fourth column of your information and record sheets. 
Your redemption value for each item may be found in your " list of valua-
tions. " You will notice that all of your redemption values are between $0.00 
and $1. 99. Each of these values was drawn perfectly randomly in the range from 
$0.00 to $ 1.99 for each bidder. Each value for each bidder for each item is 
equally likely to be anywhere from $0.00 to $ 1.99. Therefore, different bidders 
will almost certainly have different values for each item. All values are in penny 
increments. The only values you know for sure are your own, and you are not 
to reveal any information about these to anyone else. 
Remember , each lot may consist of several items. The total value to you of 
a lot equals the sum of your redemption values for the items in the lot. For your 
convenience, your total redemption value for each lot has been calculated for 
you and is listed in column 3 of your information and record sheet. 
Your Profit 
If someone else submits a higher bid than yours for a particular lot, you neither 
receive nor pay any money. Your profit for that lot is zero. 
If your bid for a lot is higher than any other bid for that lot , then the exper-
imenter will pay you your redemption values for all items in that lot minus your 
bid for that lot. Your profit for that lot , if you win, is equal to the difference 
between your total redemption value for the lot and your bid for the lot. For 
example, suppose that lot #2 consisted of items 48 , 53, and I 17, and your 
values for these items were $0 .91 , $ 1.45, and $0 .61, respectively. Then your 
total redemption value for lot #2 is 
$0.91 + $1.45 + $0.6 1 = $2.97. 
If you submitted a bid of $ 1.29 for lot #2 and this was the highest bid submi tted 
by any bidder for lot #2 , then your profit for this lot would be 
$2.97 - $ 1.29 = $ 1.68 . 
If you and at least one other bidder tie for the highest bid on a lot, then your 
profit equals your total redemption value minus your bid divided by the number 
of winning bidders. In the example above. if one other bidder also submitted a 
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bid of $ 1. 29 and no one submitted a bid higher than $ 1. 29. then your profit 
would be 
$1.68 
- 2- = $0. 84. 
Your total profits for the experiment will be the sum of your profits in each 
auction plus a payment of $3 .00 for your participation. 
Recording Instructions 
Each market year, your bids should be recorded in column 5 of your infor-
mation and record sheet and on the bidding forms which have been provided for 
you by the experimenter. When you have completed your bidding form raise 
your hand and the experimenter will collect it. After everyone has submitted 
their bidding forms for that year, the experimenter wi ll announce the highest 
bid and the second highest bid for each lot. Please record the highest bid in 
column 6 of your info rmation and record sheet. The experimenter wi ll also 
announce whether there were any ties . When the experimenter has finished this, 
you should record your profit for each lot in the last column of your information 
and record sheet. Your total profit for the market year is computed by add ing 
rows 1 through 18. Please record this number in the box at the bottom of the 
page. When everyone has done this , we will proceed to the next market year. 
Are there any questions') 
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NOTES 
I. This 111odel of the bidd ing process was originally formulated in Vickrey ( 196 1 ). 
2. This is a well-known prediction of Vickrey' s bidding model 
3. All subjects were undergraduate students at the Cal iforn ia Institute of Technology. 
4 . The cutoff points to determine in which category a buyer belongs were chosen so that the 
expected nu111ber of cases in each category were approximately equal. Due to correlation between 
111agnitude and variation of values the expected number of cases is not exactly the same across all 
the nine categories . This results in a s111all sacrifice of the efficiency of our statistical tests. For cells 
II and V the categories were divided in the following way: 111 = magnitude of valuation = (sum 
of valuations of items in the lot)/( number of items in the lot): s = variation of valuat ions = (su111 
of absolute differences between the values of items in the lot and 111 for that lot)/(number of ite111s 
in the lot). 
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A 118 .3 < Ill < 199 > 30 
B 81.7 < Ill < 11 8 .3 > 30 
c 0 < Ill < 8 1.7 > 30 
D 11 8.3 < 111 < 199 15 < s < 30 
E 81.7 < Ill < 11 8.3 15 < s < 30 
G 0 < Ill < 8 1.7 15 < s < 30 
F 118 .3< 111 < 199 0 < s < 15 
H 81 .7 < Ill < 11 8.3 0 < s < 15 
0 < 111 < 8 1.7 0 < s < 15 
For cel ls Ill and VJ. the categories were divided in the fo llowing way: 
A 11 5 < Ill < 199 > 40 
B 85 < 111 < 115 > 40 
c 0 < 111 < 85 > 40 
D 115 < Ill < 199 30 < s < 40 
E 85 < Ill < 11 5 30 < s < 40 
F 0 < Ill < 85 30 < s < 40 
G 11 5 < Ill < 199 0 < s < 30 
H 85 < Ill < 11 5 0 < s < 30 
0 < m < 85 0 < s < 30 
5 . These entries arc hypothes ized to be significantly greate r than zero. (In al l tables. standa rd 
e rrors are in pa rentheses be low the appropriate sample mean.) 
6. These entries arc hypothesized to be significant ly Jess than zero. 
7. These entries are hypothesized to be s ign ificantly greater than zero. 
8. All e ntries in Tab le 5. 6. and 7 a re hypothesized to be s igni ficantl y greater than zero except 
for entries for category G in the "Cell V" columns. "Cell VI" columns. and "Cell V - Cell vr · 
co lumns . which arc hypothes ized to be significantly less than zero. 
9 . All entries in Tables 8. 9. JO. 11. 13. and 14 arc hypothesized to be significantly greater 
than zero . 
JO. Consistent with fi nd ings elsewhere. bidders d id genera lly " overbid" re lative to the risk-
ne ut ral model when va luations were d istributed un iform ly (ce ll s I and IV). However. this was 1101 
general ly the case when va luations were not distributed uni form ly . In fact. wi th fo ur bidders when 
va luations were not distributed un iformly. buyers freque ntly 1111derhid re lat ive to the risk -neutra l 
model. 
11. Suppose. for example. exactl y three auct ions with two bidders were conducted in an ex-
periment- two separate auctions and one correspo11di11K bundle auction . If the bidders · values were 
1.00 and 1.25 for the first item and 1.00 and .90 for the second item and bids were .50 .. 75 and 
.50 .. 55 in the two separate auctions and 1.50. 1.40 in the bund led auctions. then the effic iency 
diffe rence would be 
[ 
1.25 + .90 2 .00 l 
----- - x JOO= 1.96 - .891 x JOO = 7.0 . 
I .25 + J. 00 1. 25 + 1.00 
12. Note that ave rage efficiency differences reported in Table 14 arc 110/ obtained by subtracti ng 
one of the entries in Table 15 from another entry in Tab le 15 . (e.g . . average efficiency d iffe rence 
Cell I - Cell II ,.0 average efficie ncy Cel l I - average effic iency Cell II ). In the example in note 
11 . above . the cfliciency d iffe rence is 7.0 but the difference between average e ffic iencies is 6.0. 
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